A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games

We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	Tsomocos, Dimitrios P.
Other Persons:	Voliotis, Dimitris (contributor)
Publisher:	[2010]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Gleichgewichtstheorie \| Equilibrium theory \| Nash-Gleichgewicht \| Nash equilibrium
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: International Game Theory Review (IGTR), 2009 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments December 1, 2009 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013142001