A new characterization of absolute qualified majority voting

We show that the class of absolute qualified majority voting rules are the only ones to satisfy Anonymity, Neutrality, Monotonicity, Weak Pareto and Decisiveness Non-Equivalence. When there are two alternatives x and y, the latter axiom states that if an individual voting for y can improve the result of x by abstaining, then it is not the case that an individual abstaining can improve the result of x by voting for x.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Houy, Nicolas
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2007, 4, p. 1-8
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Absolute Qualified Majority Voting

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094813