A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions
Year of publication: |
2009-09-01
|
---|---|
Authors: | Erdil, Aytek ; Klemperer, Paul |
Institutions: | Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford |
Subject: | multi-object auction | core | combinatorial auction | package auction | core-selecting auction | Vickrey auction | Vickrey | simultaneous ascending auction | robust design |
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