A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice

In the present paper, a new approach to equilibrium selection for very general normal form games has been constructed by introducing stochastic optimal stopping theory into classical evolutionary game theory. That is, the new game equilibrium is induced by both stochastic group evolution and decentralized rational individual choice. Moreover, stability of the game equilibrium is confirmed from both time and space dimensions.

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Year of publication:	2012-01-15
Authors:	Dai, Darong ; Shen, Kunrong

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Dai, Darong and Shen, Kunrong (2012): A New Stationary Game Equilibrium Induced by Stochastic Group Evolution and Rational Individual Choice.
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C62 - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015233277