A new weight scheme for the Shapley value

It is well known since Owen (Management Science, 1968) that the weights in the weighted Shapley value cannot be interpreted as a measure of power (i.e. of the ability to bargain) of the players. This paper proposes a new weight scheme for the Shapley value. Weights in this framework have to be interpreted as a measure of bargaining power. Two different axiomatic characterization of this new value are proposed: one including the weights in the axioms and one without.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1998-07-15
Authors:	Haeringer, Guillaume
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Shapley value \| weights \| monotonicity

More details

Extent:	application/postscript application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - PostScript; prepared on IBM PC - PC-TEX; to print on PostScript - A4; pages: 11 . 11 pages, postscript, prepared from dvips 11 pages
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005407525