A non-zero-zum War of Attrition

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including pure ones when at least one of the players is noisy. Explicit expressions for the strategies used in these Nash equilibria are obtained. Copyright Physica-Verlag 1997

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Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Baston, Victor ; Garnaev, Andrej
Published in:	Mathematical Methods of Operations Research. - Springer. - Vol. 45.1997, 2, p. 197-211
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	War of attrition \| Nash equilibrium \| game of timing

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950043