A note on bargaining power and managerial delegation in multimarket oligopolies

In a two-stage delegation game model with Nash bargaining between a manager and an owner, an equivalence result is found between this game and Fershtman and Judd's strategic delegation game (Fershtman and Judd, 1987). Interestingly, although both games are equivalent in terms of profits under certain conditions, managers obtain greater rewards in the bargaining game. This results in a redistribution of profits between owners and managers.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2012-11
Authors:	Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor ; García Enríquez, Javier ; Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos
Institutions:	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	strategic delegation \| bargaining \| product substitutability \| price

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DFAEII Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series DFAEII;2012.17 Number DFAEII;2012-17
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets ; M54 - Labor Management (team formation, worker empowerment, job design, tasks and authority, job satisfaction)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011158383