A note on collusion sustainability with optimal punishments and detection lags

In this note we characterize optimal punishments with detection lags when the market consists of n oligopolistic firms. We extend a previous note by Colombo and Labrecciosa (2006) [Colombo, L., and Labrecciosa, P., 2006. Optimal punishments with detection lags. Economic Letters 92, 198-201] to show how in the presence of detection lags optimal punish- ments fail to restore cooperation also in markets with a low number of firms.

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Year of publication:	2008-09
Authors:	Ciarreta Antuñano, Aitor ; Gutiérrez Hita, Carlos
Institutions:	Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico II, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales
Subject:	optimal punishments \| detection lags \| collusion sustainability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	DFAEII Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	The text is part of a series DFAEII 2008.08 Number 2008-08
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004972697