A Note on Contribution Games with Loss Functions

Decisions on joint funding of continuous public goods between two agents often involve heterogeneous targets. We introduce loss functions in a contribution game in order to study the effect of this conflict. Unlike Varian (1994), joint contribution occurs only if the players’ targets are sufficiently close and the sequential game reduces free riding problems, while total contribution is higher in the simultaneous game.

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Year of publication:	2011-08
Authors:	Russo, Giuseppe ; Senatore, Luigi
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Public Goods \| Intergovernmental Relations

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	H77 - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism ; H41 - Public Goods ; C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009294947