A note on equivalent comparisons of information channels

Nakata (Theory Decis 71:559–574, <CitationRef CitationID="CR5">2011</CitationRef>) presents a model of acquisition of information where the agent does not know what pieces of information she is missing. In this note, we point out some technical problems in a few of Nakata’s results and show how to correct them. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015

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Year of publication:	2015
Authors:	Barbosa, Luís ; Riella, Gil
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 78.2015, 1, p. 33-44
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Information channels \| Preferences over menus \| Weak expected utility representation \| Ordinal expected utility representation \| Additive expected utility representation

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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