A Note on Funaki and Yamato's Tragedy of the Commons

In the model of Funaki and Yamato (1999) the tragedy of the commons can be avoided with pessimistic players, while this does not hold for optimistic players. We propose a new core concept to overcome this puzzle and provide numerical simulations of simple games where the conclusions coincide or are less sensitive to behavioural assumptions.

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Year of publication:	2002-03
Authors:	Kóczy, László Á.
Institutions:	Centrum voor Economische Studiën, Faculteit Economie en Bedrijfswetenschappen

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Series:	Center for Economic Studies - Discussion papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005808072