A Note on Implementation of Bargaining Solutions

Miyagawa (Games and Economics Behavior 41(2), 292â€“308 [2002]) provides a simple extensive game form that implements a large class of two-agent bargaining solutions in subgame-perfect equilibrium. This class includes all of the Nash, Kalaiâ€“Smorodinsky, and relative utilitarian solutions. This note extends Miyagawaâ€™s result to multi-agent bargaining problems. Copyright Springer 2005

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Samejima, Yusuke
Published in:	Theory and Decision. - Springer. - Vol. 59.2005, 3, p. 175-191
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	mechanism design \| Nash program \| complete information

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10005678344