A note on Kuhn’s Theorem with ambiguity averse players

Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Aryal, Gaurab ; Stauber, Ronald
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 125.2014, 1, p. 110-114
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Extensive games \| Ambiguity \| Maxmin \| Dynamic consistency

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010939511