A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players

Kuhn’s Theorem shows that extensive games with perfect recall can equivalently be analyzed using mixed or behavioral strategies, as long as players are expected utility maximizers. This note constructs an example that illustrates the limits of Kuhn’s Theorem in an environment with ambiguity averse players who use a maxmin decision rule and full Bayesian updating.

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Year of publication:	2014-06-17
Authors:	Aryal, Gaurab ; Stauber, Ronald

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Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Aryal, Gaurab and Stauber, Ronald (2014): A Note on Kuhn’s Theorem with Ambiguity Averse Players.
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D81 - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015243346