A note on measuring voters’ responsibility

We consider a singular event of the following form: in a simple voting game, a particular division of the voters resulted in a positive outcome. We propose a plausible measure that quantifies the causal contribution of any given voter to the outcome. This measure is based on a conceptual analysis due to Braham [1], but differs from his solution to the problem of measuring causality of singular events.

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Year of publication:	2009
Authors:	Felsenthal, Dan S. ; Machover, Moshé
Institutions:	London School of Economics (LSE)
Subject:	Coleman’s measure of power to prevent action \| degrees of causation \| extent of individual responsibility for collective decision \| necessary element of a su�cient set (NESS) \| simple voting game (SVG)

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	LSE Research Online Documents on Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Published in Homo Oeconomicus, 2009, 26(2), pp. 259-271. ISSN: 0943-0180
Classification:	D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071418