A note on monotonic power indices, smaller coalitions, and new members
Year of publication: |
June 2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Karos, Dominik |
Published in: |
Theory and decision : an international journal for multidisciplinary advances in decision science. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer, ISSN 0040-5833, ZDB-ID 189247-2. - Vol. 81.2016, 1, p. 89-100
|
Subject: | Paradox of smaller coalitions | Paradox of new members | Monotonic power indices | Koalition | Coalition | Abstimmungsregel | Voting rule | Macht | Power | Spieltheorie | Game theory | EU-Mitgliedschaft | EU membership | Regierungskoalition | Coalition government | Index | Index number | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game |
-
The distribution of power in governing coalitions of the German Laender
Hiller, Tobias, (2013)
-
Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Kóczy, László Á., (2014)
-
Power indices when players can commit to reject coalitions
Kóczy, László Á., (2016)
- More ...
-
Strategic information selection
Preker, Jurek, (2024)
-
Karos, Dominik, (2013)
-
Farsighted rationality in hedonic games
Demeze-Jouatsa, Ghislain-Herman, (2021)
- More ...