A note on optimal contracting with public ex post information under limited liability
Daniel Danau, Annalisa Vinella
| Year of publication: |
2020
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Danau, Daniel ; Vinella, Annalisa |
| Published in: |
International journal of game theory : official journal of the Game Theory Society. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 0020-7276, ZDB-ID 120387-3. - Vol. 49.2020, 1, p. 47-74
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| Subject: | Informative signals | Limited liability | Incentive compatibility | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Beschränkte Haftung | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Vertrag | Contract | Signalling | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1007/s00182-019-00674-4 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012591394