A Note on Repeated-Offers Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information.

This note analyzes a modified version of the standard repeated-offers bargaining game with one-sided incomplete information studies in Fudenberg, Levine and Tirole (1985), Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson (1986), and Ausubel and Deneckere (1989). The modification, which is introduced in the extensive form, is that the (uninformed) seller can choose to withdraw her offer immediately after the (informed) buyer accepts it. This modification is important because it removes the (implicit) commitment assumption built into the standard model that the seller is committed not to withdraw her price offer. A main result obtained is, that whether or not there is a gap between the seller's valuation and the lowest possible buyer's valuation, any seller payoff between zero and the static monopoly profit can be supported by sequential equilibria. Thus, even in the "gap" case there exist equilibria that completely reverse the Coase conjecture.