A Note on Second Order Probabilities in the Traditional Deterrence Game

This note focuses on a methodological issue that arises naturally in applications of the traditional deterrence game played under two-sided incomplete information. The problem has potentially interesting implications for the status of the conclusions we draw from various applications of the traditional deterrence game.

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Year of publication:	2010
Authors:	J, Carlson Lisa ; Raymond, Dacey
Published in:	Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy. - De Gruyter, ISSN 1554-8597. - Vol. 15.2010, 1, p. 1-12
Publisher:	De Gruyter

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008512180