A Note on the Comparative Statics of Optimal Procurement Auctions
We find a necessary and sufficient condition such that a distributional upgrade on a seller’s cost implies a lower expected procurement cost for a buyer. We also show that even under the strongest assumption about this upgrade made in the literature so far, the seller can be worse off, even if this upgrade is costless.
Year of publication: |
2007
|
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Authors: | Cisternas, Gonzalo ; Figueroa, Nicolás |
Institutions: | Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile |
Saved in:
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