A note on the impact of procedures in strike models. The case of bargaining structure

For a two-period screening model of strikes it is shown that joint bargaining instead of enterprise negotiations lowers wages and implies more strikes. These results hold irrespective of the party possessing private information. The sensitivity of strike models to procedural assumptions thus seems less problematic than it may be conjectured.

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Year of publication:	1998-06-01
Authors:	GOERKE, Laszlo
Institutions:	Institut de Recherche Économique et Sociale (IRES), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Discussion Papers (REL - Recherches Economiques de Louvain).
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series UNIVERSITE CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN, Institut de Sciences Economiques Number 1998025 1 pages long
Classification:	C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; J52 - Dispute Resolution: Strikes, Arbitration, and Mediation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008505596