A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

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Authors:	Barberà, Salvador ; Gerber, Anke
Institutions:	Institut für Volkswirtschaftslehre, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakutät
Subject:	Hedonic game \| coalition formation \| stability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	IEW - Working Papers. - ISSN 1424-0459.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	The text is part of a series IEW-working papers Number 238
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005184889