A Note on the Impossibility of a Satisfactory Concept of Stability for Coalition Formation Games

In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that "solutions" to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be ìresting pointsî for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.

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Year of publication:	2005-12
Authors:	Barberà, Salvador ; Gerber, Anke
Institutions:	Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE)
Subject:	Hedonic Game \| Coalition Formation \| Stability

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 248
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010851378