A Note on the Impossibility of Efficient N-Person Compromises

This note studies an allocation problem that generalizes the compromise setup of Borgers and Postl (2006) to a setting with more than two agents, and generalizes their impossibility result.

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Year of publication:	2006-06
Authors:	Postl, Peter
Institutions:	Department of Economics, University of Birmingham
Subject:	mechanism design with non-transferrable utility

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D70 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making. General ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005178149