A note on the suboptimality of right-of-first-refusal clauses

We show that, under independent private values, no mechanism that contains a right-of-first-refusal clause can maximize the sum of the utilities of the seller and the right-holder.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Arozamena, Leandro ; Weinschelbaum, Federico
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2006, 24, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	Auctions

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005110856