A reexamination of additivity of power in randomized social preference

We show that Barberá and Sonnenschein’s (1978) power function becomes additive if we replace the Paretian condition by nonimposition and monotonicity. Since these conditions are very much in the spirit of Arrow (1951), our result sharpens the analogy to Arrow’s theorem. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Nandeibam, Shasikanta
Published in:	Review of Economic Design. - Springer. - Vol. 8.2003, 3, p. 293-299
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Social welfare scheme \| binary \| Paretian \| nonimposed \| monotonic

Online Resource

Check full text access |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005370578