A Remark on Voters' Rationality in a Model of Representative Democracy.

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance restricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate's (1997) citizen-candidate model of representative democracy. Copyright 2002 by Blackwell Publishing Inc.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	De Sinopoli, Francesco ; Turrini, Alessandro
Published in:	Journal of Public Economic Theory. - Association for Public Economic Theory - APET, ISSN 1097-3923. - Vol. 4.2002, 2, p. 163-70
Publisher:	Association for Public Economic Theory - APET

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005215891