A Remark on Voters' Rationality in Besley and Coate Model of Representative Democracy.

Voting games are characterized by the emergence of dominated strategies, that would be iteratively deleted by rational players. In this note we show, via an example, how applying iterated dominance retricts the set of equilibrium outcomes in Besley and Coate (1997) citizen-candidate model of representative democracy.

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Year of publication:	1999
Authors:	De Sinopoli, F. ; Turrini, A.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	SOCIAL CHOICE \| GAME THEORY \| VOTING

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Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005478972