A Renegotiation-Proof Mechanism for a Principal-Agent Model with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
In this article I shall analyze a principal-agent model with moral hazard and adverse selection. I show that for a large class of environments, communication has no value to the principal and that he cannot do better than to average over the different types of agents. This observation is then used to derive a renegotiation-proof mechanism.
Year of publication: |
1989
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Authors: | Demougin, Dominique M. |
Published in: |
RAND Journal of Economics. - The RAND Corporation, ISSN 0741-6261. - Vol. 20.1989, 2, p. 256-267
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Publisher: |
The RAND Corporation |
Saved in:
Online Resource
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