A seCure reversion protocol that generates payoffs dominating correlated equilibrium

We define the reversion protocol of a voluntarily implementable Bayesian mechanism in which risk-averse players have no incentive to cheat or to deviate from the mediator’s recommendation and that can greatly improve their equilibrium expected payoffs as compared to those generated through coordination applied to the results of an unsatisfactory mediation.

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Year of publication:	2010-09
Authors:	Wanko, Cédric
Institutions:	LAboratoire Montpelliérain d'Économie Théorique et Appliquée (LAMETA), Faculté de sciences économiques

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Working Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	16 pages
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009003177