A separate monitoring organ and disclosure of firm-specific information
Year of publication: |
March-April 2016
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Authors: | Wu, Zhenyu ; Li, Yuanshun ; Ding, Shujun ; Jia, Chunxin |
Published in: |
The European journal of finance. - Abingdon, Oxon : Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, ISSN 1351-847X, ZDB-ID 1282412-4. - Vol. 22.2016, 4/6, p. 371-392
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Subject: | idiosyncratic risk | information disclosure | monitoring | corporate governance | Unternehmenspublizität | Corporate disclosure | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Theorie | Theory | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information | Risiko | Risk | Öffentlichkeitsarbeit | Public relations | Auskunftspflicht | Disclosure regulation | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal ; Konferenzbeitrag ; Conference paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.1080/1351847X.2012.762410 [DOI] |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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