A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities

This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply this result to Cournot and Bertrand games and to public goods economies.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Marini, Marco A. ; Currarini, Sergio
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Core \| cooperative games \| externalities

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005620003