A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities

This paper proposes a formulation of coalitional payoff possibilities in games with externalities, based on the assumption that forming coalitions can exploit a ”first mover advantage”. We derive a characteristic function and show that when outside players play their best response noncooperatively, the core is nonempty in games with strategic complements. We apply this result to Cournot and Bertrand games and to public goods economies.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2003
Authors:	Marini, Marco A. ; Currarini, Sergio

freely available

Full text |

More access options

Check Google Scholar

In German libraries (KVK)

I need help

More details

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Marini, Marco A. and Currarini, Sergio (2003): A sequential approach to the characteristic function and the core in games with externalities. Published in: Koray S. and Sertel, M. R. (eds.), pp.233-250, Advances in Economic Design, Springer Verlag, Berlin & London (2003): pp. 233-251.
Classification:	C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	BASE

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015217919