A Short Note on Joint Welfare Maximization Assumption

Non-cooperative game theoretical models of International Environmental Agreements (lEAs) use the assumption that coalition of signatories maximizes their joint welfare. In this paper, the joint maximization assumption is compared to different welfare sharing schemes such as Shapley value, Nash bargaining solution and consensus value. The results show that the joint welfare maximization assumption is similar to the Nash bargaining solution.

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Year of publication:	2008
Authors:	Osmani, Dritan ; Tol, Richard S J
Published in:	The IUP Journal of Managerial Economics. - IUP Publications. - Vol. VI.2008, 3, p. 22-39
Publisher:	IUP Publications

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005398949