A short proof of the Bulow-Klemperer auctions vs. negotiations result

Bulow and Klemperer [1] have provided an upper bound on the value of bargaining power for a seller of an indivisible object. Specifically, negotiating optimally with N buyers yields lower revenue than an English auction with N + 1 buyers. In this paper, a short and intuitive proof of this result is presented. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Kirkegaard, René
Published in:	Economic Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 28.2006, 2, p. 449-452
Publisher:	Springer
Subject:	Auctions \| Negotiations \| Rationing

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005753354