A simple “market value” bargaining model for weighted voting games: characterization and limit theorems
Year of publication: |
2006
|
---|---|
Authors: | Owen, Guillermo ; Lindner, Ines ; Feld, Scott ; Grofman, Bernard ; Ray, Leonard |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 35.2006, 1, p. 111-128
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Voting | Game theory | Market values | Bargaining |
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