A simple procedure to obtain the extreme core allocations of an assignment market
Year of publication: |
2007
|
---|---|
Authors: | Izquierdo, Josep ; Núñez, Marina ; Rafels, Carles |
Published in: |
International Journal of Game Theory. - Springer. - Vol. 36.2007, 1, p. 17-26
|
Publisher: |
Springer |
Subject: | Assignment game | Core | Extreme core points | Max-payoff vectors |
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