A Simple Procedure to Obtain the Extreme Core Allocations of an Assignment Market
Year of publication: |
2006-04
|
---|---|
Authors: | Izquierdo, Josep Mª ; Núñez, Marina ; Rafels, Carles |
Institutions: | Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (Barcelona GSE) |
Subject: | assignment game | core | extreme core points | max-payoff vectors |
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