A simple supermodular mechanism that implements Lindahl allocations
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Van Essen, Matthew |
Published in: |
Journal of public economic theory. - Malden, Mass. : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1097-3923, ZDB-ID 1468434-2. - Vol. 15.2013, 3, p. 363-377
|
Subject: | Allokation | Allocation | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Mechanismus-Design-Theorie | Mechanism design | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Öffentliche Güter | Public goods | Experiment | Theorie | Theory |
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