A Spatial Model with Endogenous Linkage Strategies : Programmatic and Clientelsitic Electoral Campaigns

We propose an extension of the traditional spatial model that combines both programmatic as well as clientelistic modes of electoral vote-seeking. In particular, we model parties that strategically choose (1) their policy position, (2) the effort they devote to clientelism as opposed to the promotion of their programmatic position, and (3) the set of voters who are provided with clientelistic benefits (defined as the target set). We identify conditions under which the possibility for clientelistic campaign appeals leads to infinite cycling between the competing linkage strategies; conditions under which parties compete on purely programmatic grounds and converge to the median voter’s ideal policy (median-voter programmatic Nash Equilibria); and conditions under which parties exert some positive effort to clientelistic practices (clientelistic equilibria). The model suggests that parties should adopt centrist positions, and choose highly ‘inclusive’ target sets, when voters care very less about clientelism; but should adopt more extreme policy positions and more ‘exclusive’ target sets when voters care a lot about clientelism