A Stackelberg Game Model of Dynamic Duopolistic Competition with Sticky Prices

We develop the following Stackelberg game model of dynamic duopoly with sticky prices the leader chooses its time profile of outputs to maximize the discounted sum of proftis, while the follower chooses the optimal output to maximize the instantaneous profit as a myopic profit maximizer at each point of time. Then, we compare the resulting outcomes with those in a Stackelberg model without price stickiness.

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Year of publication:	2006
Authors:	Fujiwara, Kenji
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 12.2006, 12, p. 1-9
Publisher:	AccessEcon
Subject:	dynamic duopoly

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	L1 - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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