A strict ex-post incentive compatible mechanism for interdependent valuations
Year of publication: |
2013
|
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Authors: | Nath, Swaprava ; Zoeter, Onno |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 121.2013, 2, p. 321-325
|
Subject: | Interdependent value | Ex-post incentive compatibility | Efficient mechanisms | Ex-post individual rationality | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Anreiz | Incentives | Spieltheorie | Game theory |
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