A Study on the Government's Subsidy Strategy of Carbon-Sink Fisheries Based on Evolutionary Game

This paper constructs a three-party evolutionary game model and analyzes the influence of each subject's behavior probability on the strategies of other subjects and the stability of the system. Based on field survey data, we simulate and analyze the effects of total government subsidies, the amount of fishermen's subsidies, and the amount of consumers' subsidies on the evolutionary outcomes of the game system. The results are as follows. Firstly, government subsidies can produce a dual incentive effect from the production side and the consumption side. The probability of government subsidies positively affects both fishermen's carbon-sink fisheries farming behaviour and consumers' decision to purchase carbon-sink fishery products. Secondly, under certain conditions, the game system can achieve a steady state, in this case, Fishermen will spontaneously engage in farming marine carbon-sink fishery, consumers will spontaneously purchase carbon-sink fishery products, and the government provides subsidies to fishermen and consumers. Thirdly, the amount of government subsidies has a negative impact on the stability of the evolutionary game system, the government subsidies for fishermen has a positive impact on the stability of the evolutionary game system, and the government subsidies for consumers has a negative impact on the stability of the evolutionary game system