A study on the incentive compensation structure with payroll tax : a continuous-time principal-agent model
| Year of publication: |
2021
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | Wang, Huan ; Lai, Chong ; Lai, Shaoyong |
| Published in: |
The North American journal of economics and finance : a journal of financial economics studies. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1062-9408, ZDB-ID 1289278-6. - Vol. 58.2021, p. 1-17
|
| Subject: | Incentive compensation | Payroll tax | Principal-agent model | Utility loss | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Gewerbesteuer | Local business tax | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Sozialversicherungsbeitrag | Social security contribution |
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