A sufficient condition for all-or-nothing information supply in price discrimination

This paper provides a sufficient condition under which the optimal policy of a monopolistic seller who is considering the tradeoff between price discrimination and information disclosure is at one of two extremes: either buyers are given access to all the available information, or the seller makes no disclosure at all.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2005-10-12
Authors:	LiCalzi, Marco
Institutions:	EconWPA
Subject:	Comparative statics \| supermodular functions \| lattice programming

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Type of Document - pdf; pages: 15. Appeared in: Rendiconti per gli Studi Economici e Quantitativi, 2005, 163–177. 15 pages
Classification:	C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory ; D8 - Information and Uncertainty
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005118566