A sufficient condition for two-person ex post implementation in a general environment

This paper establishes sufficient conditions for two-person ex post implementation of a social choice set in a general environment. A single social choice function is ex post implementable if it satisfies ex post incentive compatibility (EPIC) and ex post monotonicity no veto (EMNV) conditions. A general social choice set is ex post implementable if it satisfies another condition, intersection property (IP), in addition to the above.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Ohashi, Yoshihiro
Published in:	Mathematical Social Sciences. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896. - Vol. 69.2014, C, p. 63-68
Publisher:	Elsevier

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Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010931601