A taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games

We present a taxonomy of myopic stability concepts for hedonic games in terms of deviations, and discuss the status of the existence problems of stable coalition structures. In particular, we show that contractual strictly core stable coalition structures always exist, and provide sufficient conditions for the existence of contractually Nash stable and weak individually stable coalition structures on the class of separable games.

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Year of publication:	2005
Authors:	Sung, Shao Chin ; Dimitrov, Dinko
Publisher:	Bielefeld : Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW)
Subject:	Koalition \| Spieltheorie \| Gleichgewichtsstabilität \| Theorie \| Coalition formation \| Hedonic games \| Separability \| Taxonomy

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Series:	Working Papers ; 373
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Type of publication (narrower categories):	Working Paper
Language:	English
Other identifiers:	572384009 [GVK] hdl:10419/43765 [Handle]
Classification:	C71 - Cooperative Games ; A14 - Sociology of Economics ; D20 - Production and Organizations. General
Source:	EconStor

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272552