A test for the too-big-to-fail hypothesis for European banks during the financial crisis
Year of publication: |
2015
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mattana, Paolo ; Petroni, Filippo ; Rossi, Stefania |
Published in: |
Applied economics. - Abingdon : Routledge, ISSN 0003-6846, ZDB-ID 280176-0. - Vol. 47.2015, 4/6, p. 319-332
|
Subject: | financial crises | bailout policy | banking risk | moral hazard | TBTF | Finanzkrise | Financial crisis | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Bankenkrise | Banking crisis | Bankrisiko | Bank risk | Schuldenübernahme | Bailout | EU-Staaten | EU countries | Einlagensicherung | Deposit insurance | Bankenregulierung | Bank regulation | Europa | Europe |
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