A test of stability in a linear altruism model

Linear altruism predicts the estimated preferences to be independent of the subject’s position in the game, if the role allocation is randomly determined, because subjects, in each role, have the same preferences ex ante. We test and reject this hypothesis.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Ioannou, Christos A. ; Qi, Shi ; Rustichini, Aldo
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 121.2013, 1, p. 85-89
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Linear altruism \| Trust game \| QRE

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C51 - Model Construction and Estimation ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D03 - Behavioral Economics; Underlying Principles
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010702789