A theory of fair random allocation under priorities
Year of publication: |
2024
|
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Authors: | Han, Xiang |
Published in: |
Theoretical Economics. - ISSN 1555-7561. - Vol. 19.2024, 3, p. 1185-1221
|
Publisher: |
New Haven, CT : The Econometric Society |
Subject: | Indivisible object | weak priority | random allocation | fairness | deferred acceptance algorithm | probabilistic serial mechanism |
Type of publication: | Article |
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Type of publication (narrower categories): | Article |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 10.3982/TE5262 [DOI] 1898328668 [GVK] |
Classification: | C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; d47 ; D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations ; D78 - Positive Analysis of Policy-Making and Implementation |
Source: |
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